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Abstract 
The paper analyses the relationship between individual tenure and the ap-
plication of collective contracts at the firm level, using a multi-level model 
and a German linked employer-employee data set for the years 1990, 
1995 and 2001. The main result is that elapsed tenure is longer in firms 
applying collective contracts than in companies with individual wage-
setting. Thus workers in firms with collective contracts benefit not only 
from higher wages, but also from higher job stability. Furthermore, we 
find no significant changes in mean tenure during the nineties as well as 
stable differences across wage-setting regimes. 
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1 Introduction 
Our paper analyses the relationship between individual tenure and the ap-
plication of collective contracts at the firm level, using German linked-
employer-employee data and applying a multi-level model. 
Job stability has increasingly attracted professional interest during the last 
two decades, focusing on changes in the distribution of tenure and in par-
ticular on the issue of whether job stability and tenure have decreased. 
This potential decline is important for at least two reasons. Firstly, it might 
be indicative of a change of the employment contract with the “old” con-
tract promising to exchange hard work for job security and the “new” con-
tract rewarding skills in accordance with actual market valuations so that 
incentives for job tenure decline both for employers and employees (Le-
vine et al. 2002). Secondly, German employees assess job security to be 
the most important issue on the agenda of unions with a reduction of un-
employment and a hike of wages ranked second and third on a scale of 13 
items (IG Metall 2001). 
Job stability can be measured by quits, dismissals, separations and ten-
ure. Mumford and Smith (2004) emphasize that tenure has the advantage 
of capturing the behavior of workers and firms in the longer run. Similar 
to their approach – but using a more elaborated empirical method – we 
will assume that tenure is correlated with individual characteristics and 
that the strength and the direction of this correlation vary with the firm 
where an individual is employed: Some firms might find it more advanta-
geous to establish and retain long-term relationships with their workforce, 
for instance companies with a highly qualified workforce. 
Unions bargain for higher wages and improved working conditions of their 
members and are sometimes characterized as a voice institution for work-
ers. Workers are less likely to quit under these conditions and tenure is 
longer than for non-unionized workers as Freeman and Medoff (1984) 
found for the USA. However, in continental Europe’s systems of corpora-
tist wage-setting the application of collective wage contracts within firms 
is arguably more important for wages, working conditions and tenure than 
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individual union membership. Firms covered by collective contracts do 
usually not differentiate across workers with and without union member-
ship (OECD 2004). 
Accordingly, our study concentrates on the impact of collective contracts 
on tenure as an important firm-level determinant of individual tenure. This 
impact has been neglected in the literature, and in accordance with the 
effect of union membership on tenure in the U.S. we expect job tenure to 
be longer in firms applying collective contracts in Germany. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical and 
empirical background, and Section III presents the econometric proce-
dure. In Section IV the variables and data are described. The empirical 
results are discussed in Section V, while Section VI summarizes. 
2 Theoretical and Empirical Background 
The literature on tenure draws on widely accepted theories like human 
capital theory, the theory of incentives, matching theory. A precondition of 
investments in firm specific capital for workers (Becker 1975) and of 
workers’ acceptance of seniority wages (Lazear 1981) is a sufficiently long 
expected tenure at the present employer. In addition, efficiency wages 
and promotion tournaments are more efficient incentive devices when 
employment relationships encompass a long time horizon (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992). Matching theory (Mortensen 2003) argues that information 
asymmetries concerning employer and employee characteristics lose im-
portance during a longer lasting employment relationship. Recent theo-
retical attempts combine flows of workers and jobs into an aggregate 
matching model. The flow concepts of workers and jobs model tenure as 
the result of the decisions made by different parties - quits initiated by the 
worker and the layoffs initiated by the firm (Burgess and Rees 1996). 
More generally, search theory can explain quits, whereas layoffs are de-
rived from the dynamic labor demand theory, modelling the process of job 
creation and destruction (Caballero and Hammour 1994). One important 
insight of these very different approaches to explain tenure is that wages 
and tenure are positively correlated. Abraham and Farber (1987) and Al-
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tonji and Shakotko (1987) present some early empirical evidence of the 
proposed positive relationship. 
Various potential causes for a declining duration of job tenure are ad-
dressed in the recent literature. First and foremost, the spread of new in-
formation technologies driven by their drastically falling prices tends to 
decimate routine tasks and to complement non-routine tasks (Autor et al. 
2003). Since routine tasks often embody firm-specific human capital, the 
relative demand for workers with long tenure recedes. Second, during the 
last decade continental European labor markets have become more flexi-
ble by facilitating the use of fixed employment contracts and relaxing 
somewhat the restrictions imposed on dismissals. Third, trade union den-
sity and bargaining coverage rates declined in the OECD area since 1970 
(OECD 2004: 145). Fourth, the composition of the workforce has changed 
in favor of an increasing share of female employees with generally less 
tenure than their male counterparts.  
Recent empirical evidence indicates that the duration of job tenure has not 
declined substantially in the EU, the US and Japan (Auer and Cazes 2000, 
Neumark et al. 2000, Givord and Maurin 2004, Burgess and Rees 1998, 
Mumford and Smith 2004, Bergemann and Mertens 2004). For the US 
tenure decreased in the 1980s for younger, less qualified workers, while it 
declined in the first half of the 1990s for older experienced male employ-
ees. These declines were matched by an increase in tenure for older fe-
males and females with a longer education. Using the German Socioeco-
nomic Panel Bergemann and Mertens (2004) show that women’s median 
elapsed tenure fluctuates around 6 years in the period 1984-1999. Men’s 
median elapsed tenure, however, declines from a maximum of 9.4 years 
in 1984 to 8.7 years in 1985 and barely varies till the end of the 1980s. It 
drops to 7.8 years in 1990 and to 7.5 years in 1999. Even excluding the 
outstanding value for 1984 the data indicate a decline in median elapsed 
tenure for men, particularly if the 1990s are compared to the 1980s. In 
the 1990s, however, tenure remains relatively stable for the two genders. 
Since we concentrate on the impact of collective contracts on tenure, the 
union-exit voice discussion (Freeman 1980) provides a useful starting 
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point for the analysis. It emphasizes the monetary and non-monetary 
gratification of the current job and the personal characteristics which in-
fluence the costs of job mobility. Thus, the expression of union voice in 
conjunction with a wage premium due to collective contracts should re-
duce labor turnover and increase the incentive for employers to invest in 
firm-specific training as a response to the longer expected payback period. 
In addition, collective contracts as an application of collective voice might 
improve the enforcement of contracts and reduce the risk of hold up, if 
employers try to appropriate sunken investments of workers in training. In 
the German system of industrial relations, however, collective voice is fre-
quently attributed to works councils (Hübler and Jirjahn 2003). Works 
councils as collective voice institutions might act differently in covered and 
uncovered firms. A noteworthy finding of Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) is that 
presence of works councils has a stronger positive effect on wages in un-
covered than in covered firms which should mitigate the incentives for 
longer tenure we expect to find in the collective bargaining regime. 
A further important point is that collectively bargained wages can be in-
terpreted as minimum wages, and that firms applying collective contracts 
will adjust employment rather than wages. Firms can be supposed to util-
ize times with unexpectedly bad economic conditions to renege implicit 
labor market contracts, which have been established to cope with incen-
tive problems in employment relationships (Valetta 1999, Levine et al. 
2002). Thus, in particular during economic recessions less recruitment 
- instead of recruitment at lower wages - and more lay-offs should charac-
terize these firms. However, during economic booms we would expect less 
voluntary quits in firms covered by collective contracts. The first effect im-
plies that the difference in mean tenure across firms applying, respectively 
not applying collective contracts should increase during recessions, while 
the second effect would suggests that the difference should increase dur-
ing boom periods.  
The wage as the dominating benefit of the current job is clearly endoge-
nous in the determination of tenure. In a seminal article Freeman (1980) 
has attempted to account for the simultaneity of the wage in the tenure 
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regression. It is obvious that the application of collective contracts tends 
to influence both wages and tenure. However, recent studies trying to ad-
just for this simultaneity obtain very diverse results (see Abowd and Kang 
2002 for an overview). We thus follow the suggestion of Mumford and 
Smith (2004) to simplify the analysis and estimate a reduced form tenure 
equation. Note that a companion paper (Stephan and Gerlach 2004) 
shows that collective contracts raised wages and compressed returns to 
human capital in the 90s. Also some further investigations on the labor 
market impacts of unions and coverage by collective contracts for Ger-
many emphasize the wage aspect (Jirjahn and Klodt 1998, Hübler and Jir-
jahn 2003, Hübler and Meyer 2001). 
Not much effort, however, has been spent to analyse empirically the rela-
tionship between collective contracts and job tenure. The present paper 
seeks in part to redress this imbalance. It does so by exploring the corre-
lation of tenure with individual characteristics of workers and by investi-
gating how this correlation might depend on the firm and its employment 
policy: The presence or absence of collective contracts is considered to be 
an important element of the firm’s employment policy. 
The subsequent analysis is based on a linked employer-employee data set 
and applies a multi-level model of employment duration. For a federal 
German state and for the last decade we will primarily test whether tenure 
is longer in firms applying collective contracts than in uncovered compa-
nies and secondarily whether the effect of collective contracts on tenure 
varies across the business cycle. 
3 Econometric Model 
The following approach can be interpreted as an extension of the analysis 
by Mumford and Smith (2004) for Great Britain and Gerlach and Stephan 
(2004) for Germany, who regress at the first level tenure on characteris-
tics of employees using a fixed effects model, and regress at the second 
level estimated fixed effects on firm characteristics. We apply a 
multivariate model consisting of two levels (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). 
As has already been mentioned, the approach explores the correlation of 
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tenure with individual characteristics of workers and investigates how this 
correlation depends on firm characteristics that are essential for a firm’s 
employment policy. 
At the first level elapsed tenure tij of individual i = 1…N in firm j = 1…M is 
determined by a K×1-vector of explaining variables xij, which includes a 
constant and K-1 observed worker characteristics. 
(1) tij = xij’βj + rij.
The individual level residual is given by rij ~ N(0,σ2). The critical 
assumption is that the K×1-vector of parameters βj varies across firms. We 
assume at the second level of the model that βj is determined by a L×1-
vector wj, which includes a constant and L-1 observed firm characteristics. 
With Wj = IK⊗wj’ as a K×K⋅L-matrix it follows 
(2) βj = Wjγ + uj. 
The K⋅L×1-parameter vector γ incorporates systematic influences on 
elapsed tenure in the economy. The K×1-vector of firm level residuals uj ~ 
N(0,T) contains for each firm the deviation of firm-specific parameters 
from their expected value, given wj resp. Wj. Concerning the covariances 
the following assumptions are made: Cov(rij,ukj) = 0, Cov(xkij,rij) = 0, 
Cov(wlj,ukj) = 0, Cov(wlj,rij) = 0 and Cov(xkij,uk‘j) = 0 for all k, k‘ and l and 
with k = 1...K and l = 1...L, where xkij, wlj and ukj are single elements of 
xij, wj and uj (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, p.255).  
For the estimation of γ the true parameters βj in (2) are approximated by 
firm-specific ordinary-least-square estimates , jβˆ
(3)  = Wjβˆ jγ + uj + ej
which involves an additional error term ej ~ N(0,Vj). Equation (3) is then 
estimated by Generalized Least Squares, 
(4) γˆ  = (Σ Wj’ ∆j-1 Wj)-1 Σ Wj’ ∆j-1   
 with ∆
jβˆ
j = Var( ) = Var(ujβˆ j + ej) = T + Vj. 
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However, this requires estimates of the covariance matrix T and the 
matrix Vj. Maximum likelihood estimates are obtained by an iterative 
procedure, adjusting the estimates of the fixed parameters γ during each 
step. 
To take into account presumed heteroscedasticity, the variances of rij can 
explicitely be modeled as 
(5)  σij2 = exp{cij‘α},
with Cij of the vector of variables that are a source of heteroscedasticity. 
The functional form ensure that σij2 exhibits only positive values 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, pp. 131 ff.). 
This model is used to estimate models of tenure differentials across firms, 
conditional on characteristics of individual workers. It presupposes the 
availability of linked employee and firm information. 
4 Data and Variables 
The empirical analysis is based on a linked employer-employee data set, 
the Lower Saxonian data from the Salary and Wage Structure Survey 
(“Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung”) of the Statistical Offices of the 
Federal German States for the years 1990, 1995 and 2001. Lower Saxony 
is one of the larger federal states in northwest Germany and covers 
around 11 percent of all West German employees. Figure 1 gives an 
impression of the economic situation in Lower Saxony during the time 
period under consideration. While Germany’s unification induced a boom 
and correspondingly comparatively low and falling unemployment rates in 
1990, the economic situation worsened after 1992, with a maximum in 
unemployment in 1997. In the following years unemployment was falling 
moderately until 2001. 
The data are drawn as a two-stage random sample from all 
establishments in the entire manufacturing sector and in selected service 
sectors in Lower Saxony. Establishments as well as employees included in 
the data set differ in successive surveys. Our analysis is restricted to full-
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time employees with a working time of at least 30 weekly hours, and 
employment in manufacturing, electricity, gas, water supply, construction, 
wholesale and retail trade, or financial intermediation. Furthermore, only 
workers from firms with 100 to 10.000 employees, at least 20 
observations and non-zero within-firm variance for the first level 
explaining variables are retained. The reason for these size restrictions is 
that starting values for our estimates are obtained from firm-specific OLS 
estimates, which require a sufficient number of observations per firm.  
Our dependent variable is elapsed, i.e. incomplete tenure. This variable 
can be utilized to describe quite neatly the structure of firms’ workforces 
(Erlinghagen and Mühge 2002). It is however, less appropriate for 
analyzing the labor market situation as such than completed tenure. Note, 
however, that renewal theory (Burgess and Rees 1996) shows that under 
certain assumptions the best estimate of completed tenure can be gained 
by doubling the elapsed tenure period. In this paper, however, our 
dependent variable is elapsed tenure. 
The following variables are included in xij at the individual level: A 
constant, a dummy for gender, years required to achieve the highest 
educational attainment (abbreviated as schooling) and age. The 
specification might seem quite parsimonious and we admit that a host of 
additional factors will have an impact on tenure. As a defense of our 
specification it should be taken into account that the individual level 
coefficients are dependent variables in the second stage of the estimation 
as equation (2) indicates. Furthermore, each additional first level variable 
reduces the number of observations available for the multivariate analysis, 
since we can utililize only the observations of workers from firms with a 
non-zero within-firm variance of first level variables and their interactions. 
At the firm level in wj the following variables are considered: A constant, 
dummies for the survey year, dummies for the application of a sectoral or 
firm level collective contract, dummies for the interactions between the 
application of collective contracts and the survey year, firm size, mean of 
years of schooling in a company, the share of female employees and the 
sectoral affiliation of the firms. Note that our data contain information on 
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the application of collective contracts on the firm level, but not on the 
presence of a works council. However, firms with more than 100 employ-
ees apart from rare exceptions do not have works councils (Addison, 
Schnabel and Wagner 1998); we thus basically estimate the impact of 
firms with and without collective coverage on tenure while holding con-
stant the presence of works councils. Regrettably we have no information 
on firms’ age - the duration of elapsed tenure cannot exceed the age of 
the firm an individual is working for. 
Finally, the first level variance is modeled as a function of age according to 
equation (6), to account for heteroscedasticity, since the dispersion of 
tenure increases with individual age. 
With the exception of the dummy variables for the wage-setting regime 
and survey year all variables are centered around their grand mean. In 
consequence, the first level constant β0 from equation (1) informs us 
about the amount of elapsed tenure that a standard worker – mean years 
of age and schooling and female gender with a probability of 0.26 
(Table 1) – can expect to accumulate, dependent on the firm he is 
working for. The second level constant γ0 from equation (2) describes the 
relationship across individual characteristics and elapsed tenure within 
otherwise standard firms that do not apply a collective contract in the 
survey year 1990. 
In interpreting the results the following restriction should be taken into 
account: The applied method does not control for self-selection of workers 
into firms and of firms into wage-setting regimes. Furthermore, the data 
are not a panel and do not allow to control for unobserved worker 
heterogeneity. Thus, the results presented have to be interpreted as 
correlations rather than as causal relationships. 
5 Empirical Results 
Descriptive results are summarized in Table 1. Mean tenure in the pooled 
sample is 11.65 years, with a minimum in 1990 (11.04 years) and a 
maximum in 1995 (12.14 years). With respect to wage-setting regimes a 
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rank order of mean tenure is clearly visible: 12.72 years for firms applying 
firm level collective contracts, followed by 11.91 years in the group of 
firms applying sectoral level contracts and 8.35 years in firms negotiating 
individual wages. Figure 2 displays the distribution functions of elapsed 
tenure by wage-setting regime and gender – women working in firms 
negotiating wages individually have the shortest tenure, whereas men 
working under firm level collective contracts exhibit the longest mean 
tenure.  
Returning to Table 1, average tenure has been more than three years 
higher for men than for women in 1990, but the difference declines to less 
than two years in 2001. As expected, tenure decreases with years of 
schooling and increases with age. Remarkably, the share of workers of 
age up to 25 in the sample dropped from 16 percent in 1990 to 6 percent 
in 2001, while the share of middle-aged workers has increased and the 
share of older workers has remained constant. Furthermore, mean tenure 
increases slightly with firm size and there are noticable differences across 
sectors, with mean tenure being above average in particular in electricity, 
gas, water supply and in financial intermediation. 
Table 2 presents the results of the multi-level model. Probability values 
refer to heteroscedastic-consistent, Huber-corrected standard errors 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, pp. 276 ff.). Remember that the first level 
constant β0 is a function of firm characteristics and describes elapsed ten-
ure for a standard worker, dependent on the characteristics or the firm 
this worker is employed at. The second level constant γ0 describes the im-
pact of individual characteristics on elapsed tenure in an otherwise stan-
dard firm that does not apply any collective contract in 1990. 
Let us start discussing results for the first level constant. Ceteris paribus 
elapsed tenure is 1.4 years longer for a standard worker under sectoral 
level collective contracts than in firms applying individual level contracts 
(row 4, column 1) and 1.6 years higher in companies with firm level 
collective contracts (row 7, column 1). These differences are smaller than 
those found in the descriptive analysis, but – in line with our basic 
hypothesis – the impact of collective contracts on tenure is significant and 
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positive. Thus although the distinctions across wage-setting regimes found 
in the descriptive statistics are partly a result of the sample composition, 
an impact of the wage-setting regime is detected after controlling for 
observed individual and firm characteristics. Self-selection of workers and 
firms into collective contracts as well as unobserved heterogeneity of 
workers and firms might play a role in explaining the longer mean tenure 
under collective contracts. 
A noteworthy result is that all year dummies are insignificant (rows 2, 3, 
5, 6, 8, 9, column 1) indicating that we do not find significant changes in 
elapsed tenure for the standard worker over the time period investigated. 
It follows that differences in mean tenure across years found in the 
descriptive statistics (Table 1) can be due to changes in the composition 
of the workforce covered by the sample. A companion paper (Stephan and 
Gerlach 2004) shows that collective contracts have raised wages and 
compressed returns to human capital during the nineties. The results 
obtained in this paper suggest that the stronger impact of collective 
contracts on wages during recessions does not carry over to the length of 
tenure. One interpretation might be that companies with collective 
contracts are characterized by less recruitment and more lay-offs during 
recessions as well as by declining quits during boom periods so that the 
effect of collective contracts on tenure hardly varies across the business 
cycle.  
Given the focus of this paper we comment only briefly on the results of 
the other firm level variables. A standard worker’s tenure increases 
slightly, but significantly, with firm size (row 10, column 1) and is 
comparatively higher in the sectors electricity, gas, water supply and 
financial intermediation and declines in construction (rows 11, 14, 12, 
column 1) which accords with our priors. A standard worker’s elapsed 
tenure can be expected to be longer if he or she works in a firm with 
above average years of schooling of the workforce, which could imply 
positive external effects of schooling (row 15, column 1). Furthermore, the 
share of female workers within a firm has a significantly negative sign 
(row 16, column 1), i.e. reducing a standard worker’s tenure.  
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Let us now turn to the individual level variables. With the exception of two 
sectors we do not find an impact of individual gender on the duration of 
elapsed tenure having controlled for individual and firm characteristics 
(column 2). However, as has been noticed above we find a significant 
effect of the share of female workers within firms. We interpret this 
finding in the sense that women are segregated in companies with on 
average low tenure. A similar finding has been obtained for Great Britain 
by Mumford and Smith (2004). Age is highly significant for the duration of 
elapsed tenure. Furthermore, age “pays more” in terms of its impact on 
tenure in firms applying collective contracts, in larger firms and in sectors 
(electricity, gas, water supply and financial intermediation) with 
presumably strong internal labor markets (column 3). Evidently these 
companies and sectors continue to protect their workers against economic 
forces which tend to reduce tenure. With a worker’s years of schooling his 
expected elapsed tenure falls (column 4). This might be explained by the 
fact that better qualified workers spend more years on education and start 
working at a higher age. Furthermore, they might on average be more 
mobile than workers with less education. The result does, however, not 
support the - theoretically ambivalent - idea that qualified workers have in 
general more firm-specific human capital and are more strongly affected 
by incentive problems inducing the pay of seniority wages than workers 
with less education (see Lazear 2004, on a discussion of the relation 
between general and specific human capital). Schooling is the only 
individual level variable where we find an impact of the year dummies – in 
2001 the effect of schooling on tenure was less negative in firms 
negotiating individual level contracts. 
Finally, it should be noted that the standard deviation of the firm level 
residuals uj from equation (2) is significantly different from zero for all 
first level variables (row 17). There are idiosyncratic firm-specific 
differences in the relationships between individual characteristics and 
tenure beyond the systematic differences explained by our firm-level 
covariates. We interpret this in the sense that it is important to account 
for firm heterogeneity when investigating determinants of individual 
tenure. 
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6 Summary 
The main result of our analysis is that elapsed tenure is significantly 
longer in firms applying collective contracts than in companies negotiating 
wages individually. On the one hand unions might – in conjunction with 
works councils – act as a voice mechanism with the results of a longer 
average tenure of the workforce and an improved productivity (Freeman 
and Medoff 1984). On the other hand the German system of industrial 
relations combined with specific restrictions of the labor law might tend to 
segregate the workforce into wage-setting regimes. Workers in firms 
applying sectoral and firm level collective contracts gain from higher 
wages and have an on average longer tenure.  
In line with the literature our analysis does not indicate significant 
changes in mean tenure during the nineties. Moreover, while the impact of 
collective contracts on wages has increased during the survey years, 
which are characterized by different phases of the business cycle, the 
correlation between collective contracts and tenure remains constant. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Lower Saxonian unemployment rate (in percent of dependent labor 
force) for the time period 1985 to 2002 
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Figure 2: Distribution of elapsed tenure by gender and wage-setting regime 
(1990, 1995 and 2001 pooled) 
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Table 1: Mean tenure and sample composition 
 Pooled 1990 1995 2001 
 Mean Share Mean Share Mean Share Mean Share
All 11.65 1.00 11.04 1.00 12.14 1.00 11.89 1.00
         
Individual characteristics                 
Men 12.39 0.74 11.98 0.73 12.87 0.74 12.28 0.77
Women 9.52 0.26 8.45 0.27 10.08 0.26 10.59 0.23
                  
Secondary school 11.60 0.20 10.69 0.22 12.18 0.19 12.53 0.17
Secondary school and apprenticeship 12.16 0.71 11.48 0.72 12.72 0.70 12.40 0.71
High-school and apprenticeship 7.00 0.03 6.07 0.02 7.09 0.04 7.72 0.04
Advanced technical college 9.97 0.03 9.83 0.02 10.25 0.03 9.67 0.04
University degree 6.44 0.02 5.10 0.01 6.92 0.03 6.77 0.03
                  
Age<=25 2.87 0.10 2.69 0.16 3.37 0.07 2.73 0.06
Age 26-45 8.86 0.58 8.69 0.53 8.94 0.60 8.99 0.62
Age >= 46 19.60 0.32 19.49 0.31 19.95 0.33 19.18 0.32
         
Firm characteristics                  
Individual wage contracts 8.35 0.10 7.56 0.10 8.74 0.10 9.06 0.10
Sectoral collective contract 11.91 0.78 11.26 0.78 12.32 0.78 12.34 0.77
Firm level collective contract 12.72 0.12 12.43 0.12 13.73 0.12 11.49 0.12
                  
Firm size 100-499 11.04 0.57 10.09 0.51 11.43 0.66 11.79 0.54
Firm size 500-999 12.15 0.22 11.26 0.26 12.96 0.20 12.99 0.17
Firm size >= 1000 12.81 0.21 12.88 0.23 14.22 0.15 11.45 0.29
                  
Manufacturing industry 11.53 0.73 11.03 0.74 12.11 0.71 11.46 0.72
Electricity. gas. water supply 14.62 0.06 14.24 0.05 15.14 0.07 14.18 0.07
Construction 10.00 0.03 9.27 0.02 9.64 0.05 11.62 0.03
Wholesale and retail trade 9.84 0.10 9.37 0.12 9.31 0.09 11.47 0.11
Financial intermediation 13.60 0.08 12.04 0.08 14.45 0.08 14.98 0.07
                  
Observations 96335   37847   37227   21261   
Number of firms 1739   631   715   393   
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Table 2: Pooled estimates for the systematic parameters γ 
First level (individual) 
  Constant Gender Age Schooling 
Second level (firm) γ Prob. γ Prob. γ Prob. γ Prob. 
Constant 10.17** 0.00 0.03 0.84 0.43** 0.00 -0.32** 0.00 
  1995 -0.15 0.75 -0.15 0.51 -0.03 0.25 -0.06 0.45 
  2001 -0.27 0.62 -0.06 0.87 0.01 0.85 0.31** 0.00 
Sectoral contract 1.38** 0.00 0.24 0.18 0.11** 0.00 0.00 0.97 
  1995 0.75 0.14 -0.03 0.90 0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.94 
  2001 0.78 0.19 0.07 0.84 0.02 0.53 -0.46** 0.00 
Firm contract 1.60** 0.00 0.10 0.69 0.10** 0.00 0.10 0.30 
  1995 0.79 0.25 0.01 0.98 0.06 0.14 -0.05 0.70 
  2001 0.45 0.65 -0.38 0.44 0.01 0.90 -0.49** 0.01 
Firm size/ 1000 0.69** 0.00 0.04 0.48 0.04** 0.00 -0.02 0.15 
Electricity. gas. water supply 1.77** 0.00 -0.73** 0.00 0.04* 0.01 -0.09 0.16 
Construction -2.41** 0.00 0.36 0.23 -0.13** 0.00 0.17* 0.05 
Wholesale and retail trade -0.11 0.64 0.61** 0.00 -0.02 0.15 0.33** 0.00 
Financial intermediation 3.93** 0.00 0.12 0.45 0.15** 0.00 0.07 0.22 
Mean years of schooling 0.24* 0.05 0.07 0.28 0.02* 0.02 -0.34** 0.00 
Share of female employees -3.32** 0.00 -1.26** 0.00 -0.23** 0.00 0.18* 0.03 
Std.-dev. uj 2.90** 0.00 1.09** 0.00 0.16** 0.00 0.38** 0.00 
Log Likelihood -301938 Log Likelihood starting values -326468 
First level constant: Base tenure.  
Second level constant: Impact on tenure in firms not applying any collective contract in 1990. 
Probability values based on robust heteroscedasticty-restistent t-values. 
*) α = 0.05. **) α = 0.01. 
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